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ABSTRACT: This article highlights the benefits a small military
enjoys with regard to networked learning through the lessons the
Netherlands’ learned while contributing to the NATO mission in
Afghanistan. Although the force seems to be reverting to enemycentric thinking, the author encourages leaders to retain an adaptive
mindset that will allow the force to adopt a more population-centric
approach when necessary.

T

he Netherlands has been involved in Afghanistan since the fall of
the Taliban regime in 2001. That event prompted the international
community to start reconstructing the country for long-term
stability. In addition to developmental aid and diplomatic support, Dutch
soldiers started deploying to Afghanistan on January 1, 2002. Since then,
the Dutch armed forces have contributed to the international coalition
in many different forms and places, including various contributions to
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): an infantry company
in Kabul (2002–03), a provincial reconstruction team (PRT) in Baghlan
(2004–06), a task force in Uruzgan province (2006–10), and a police
training mission in Kunduz province (2011–13). Also, Special Forces and
air assets such as F-16s and attack helicopters have deployed in support
of these operations as well as the wider coalition efforts that took place
under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.
By the end of the ISAF mission in 2014, the Netherlands had
participated in training Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
in northern Afghanistan as part of Resolute Support, a mission that
was extended through December 2021.1 Since the first Dutch soldier
landed in Kabul in 2002, an estimated total of 30,000 Dutch soldiers
have deployed to Afghanistan.2 That is almost two-thirds of the current
overall strength of the Dutch armed forces (39,839 active duty and
5,046 reserve).3
The various contributions to the Afghan campaign have had a huge
impact on the relatively small Dutch military. Moreover, this impact
coincided with the completion of the transformation process that
1     Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, Defensie, voor Buitenlandse Handel en
Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en van Justitie en Veiligheid [Letter of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Defence, Foreign Trade and Development Aid and Justice and Security], June 15, 2018, Dossier
27925, no. 630).
2     “Afghanistan,” Veteranen Instituut, October 2, 2014.
3     Ministerie van Defensie, Kerngegevens Defensie—Feiten en Cijfers [Essential data on defense—
facts and figures] (The Hague: Ministerie van Defensie, 2018), 26.
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reshaped the Dutch military from a Cold War force to an expeditionary
organization. Consequently, Afghanistan marked the first serious test for
the newly acquired ability to conduct military operations in conjunction
with other departments and as part of an international coalition.
So, in the eyes of the Dutch armed forces, their contributions to the
Afghanistan War were not only vast in intensity, but also challenging in
nature, a major experience for a small military.
The various deployments to Afghanistan have provided the Dutch
military with a wide range of experiences over the past seventeen years.
This article focuses on understanding how Dutch soldiers adapted to
the specifics of their mission and to the challenging Afghan operational
environment. The Dutch military is encouraged to not only take
notice of such observations, but also to explore the ways the military
community has disseminated and processed newly obtained insights. In
other words, when seeking to obtain an insight on the lessons learned by
the Dutch armed forces in Afghanistan, one should not only study the
lessons observed, but also the extent to which they have become lessons
institutionalized. This article, therefore, answers the question of which
lessons the Dutch military has learned in Afghanistan first by presenting
observations on adaptation in the field and subsequently analyzing the
way the Dutch military has institutionalized them.

Lessons Observed

The most substantial Dutch contributions took place during the
ISAF campaign. The end of this North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) campaign coincided with new Dutch missions against
the Islamic State in the Middle East (as part of Operation Inherent
Resolve) and the deployment of a contingent in support of the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
This marked the end of an era in which the Dutch armed forces had
almost exclusively focused on Afghanistan. The four-year deployment
(2006–10) of the brigade-size Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) stands out as
the defining experience during this period.4 The mission in Uruzgan
province was the largest Dutch military operation since the Indonesian
war of decolonization and the first time since the Korean War that
Dutch soldiers saw intensive combat.
The TFU experience itself demonstrated that the Dutch military is
capable of a high standard of performance in international operations
in a complicated environment. Some international observers have
attributed this success to the Dutch approach, a subtle, nonviolent way
of conducting operations by use of defense, diplomacy, and development
(3D) activities that focus on the local population and the government

4      Martijn Kitzen, Sebastiaan Rietjens, and Frans Osinga, “Soft Power, the Hard Way: Adaptation
by the Netherlands’ Task Force Uruzgan,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell,
Frans Osinga, and James A. Russell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 159–61.
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rather than on fighting the insurgent opponent.5 Yet the successful
deployment was the result of field adaptations that gradually shifted the
task force’s emphasis from an enemy-centric, kinetic approach toward
a more balanced population-centric approach tailored for Uruzgan’s
complicated operational environment.6 Since a similar pattern is
witnessed among almost all other national contingents that contributed
to the ISAF mission, the TFU case not only offers an excellent insight in
the lessons observed by Dutch soldiers, but is also highly relevant from
a comparative perspective.7
The first and perhaps most important adaptation of the Dutch task
force concerned the evolution of its military strategy. Before the start of
the mission, politicians and decisionmakers in The Hague determined
the mission’s goal as fostering stability and security in Uruzgan. This
effort included guidelines prescribing methods for augmenting the local
population’s support for the Afghan government mainly through civilmilitary cooperation and reconstruction activities. Combat troops would
provide security assistance to create a permissive environment for these
activities.8 Yet, this provided hardly any tangible direction for implication
by the task force. Basically, the TFU deployed on August 1, 2006,
without a proper campaign plan, and its commanding officer, Colonel
Theo Vleugels was told “to do what we [the TFU staff] told them [the
defense staff in The Hague] we would do.”9 Consequently, the first TFU
rotation set out to design its own plan within the framework of highlevel policy. Despite this process being initiated during predeployment
training, the definitive Master Plan was only completed two months into
the actual deployment.10 This plan laid out a military strategy following
the effects-based approach and aimed at obtaining 23 key effects in
5      For an excellent oversight of the debate on the Dutch approach see Thijs Brocades Zaalberg,
“The Use and Abuse of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies
36, no. 6 (2013): 867–97. See also Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The NeoTaliban Insurgency in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 198–99; “The Dutch
Model,” Economist, March 12, 2009; and René Moelker, “The Genesis of the ‘Dutch Approach’ to
Asymmetric Conflicts: Operations in Uruzgan and the ‘Softly, Softly’ Manner of Approaching the
Taleban,” Armed Forces & Society 40, no. 1 (2014): 96–117.
6      For a complete overview of the Dutch Uruzgan campaign see Martijn Kitzen, “The Course of
Co-option: Co-option of Local Power-Holders as a Tool for Obtaining Control over the Population
in Counterinsurgency Campaigns in Weblike Societies” (dissertation, Amsterdam University, 2016),
329–524. For the population-centric turn in TFU’s approach, see also Martijn Kitzen, “Close
Encounters of the Tribal Kind: The Implementation of Co-option as a Tool for De-escalation
of Conflict—The Case of the Netherlands in Afghanistan’s Uruzgan Province,” Journal of Strategic
Studies 35, no. 5 (2012).
7     Afghanistan: Lessons Learned (conference, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland, February
11–13, 2019). See for instance the various national case studies included in Farrell, Osinga, and
Russell, ed., Military Adaptation. The text on the key adaptations of the TFU contains some material
expanded from Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power.”
8      Brief van de Ministers.
9      Russell W. Glenn and S. Jamie Gayton, Intelligence Operations and Metrics in Iraq and Afghanistan:
Fourth in a Series of Joint Urban Operations and Counterinsurgency Studies (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 2008), 9.
10      Brigadier Theo Vleugels (commander TFU-1), interview by the author, November 12,
2009; Belinda Smeenk, Rudi Gouweleeuw, and Harm van der Have “Effect gebaseerde aanpak in
Uruzgan, van het schaakbord naar een bord spaghetti” [The effect-based approach in Uruzgan,
from checkerboard to a plate of spaghetti], Militaire Spectator 176, no. 12 (2007): 553–56; and Kitzen,
Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 167–69.
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order to increase security and stability in all main population centers
over the next two years—initial commitment was until 2008.
Unsurprisingly, it soon became clear that the Master Plan was
unsuitable as its goals proved too ambitious and its approach
inappropriate for facing the complicated neo-Taliban insurgency in a
highly fragmented local society. There had been only limited geographical
expansion of the TFU’s “ink spot”—the main population centers from
which TFU influence would gradually expand its influence—and most
of the intended effects were not met as planned.11 Therefore, the fourth
TFU rotation in 2008 set out to develop and adopt a new strategy, the
Focal Paper.
The Focal Paper was not only a consequence of the urgent need
for a more suitable campaign plan, but also of the Dutch parliament’s
decision to extend the mission for two more years, up to August 2010.12
Heavily influenced by counterinsurgency thinking, the new plan and its
framework of operations clearly echoed the ideas on counterinsurgency
introduced in the United States.13 Thus, the TFU officially adopted
counterinsurgency as its mission. The main task now became assisting
the local government in providing a stable and secure environment by
maintaining and augmenting the security situation, while simultaneously
obtaining the support of the local population.
Furthermore, the TFU would focus on facilitating the development
of governmental structures, security forces, as well as development
efforts of the Afghan authorities.14 The new campaign plan combined
the military’s methodology of structured backward planning for the
long-term with the understanding of Uruzgan’s operational environment
acquired in the first two years.15 This led to the remarkable—yet
realistic—insight that Uruzgan, as a province of the new Afghan
state, would be sufficiently developed to provide the majority of the
population with a middle income and meet their basic needs by 2050
and to have a local government in full control of all development and
security efforts.16 However, the extension of the TFU mission until 2010
rendered this year as the “beacon on TFU’s planning horizon,” and the
end state for the TFU campaign, subsequently, was to provide “the first
step towards a viable and favourable future for Uruzgan in 2050.”17 The
TFU’s short-term counterinsurgency effort, thus, was to establish an

11      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 419, 427.
12      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 419.
13      Task Force Uruzgan (TFU) G5, “Focal Paper: ‘Foundations For The Future’” (unclassified
policy paper, TFU G5, Tarin Kot, Afghanistan, July 20, 2008), 7–10; Headquarters, US Department
of the Army (HQDA), Counterinsurgency, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, (Washington: DC, HQDA, 2006),
5-3–5-17; and Colonel Richard van Harskamp (commander TFU-4), interview by the author, March
8, 2010.
14      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 4.
15        See also Harskamp, interview; and Lieutenant Colonel Wilfred Rietdijk (commander
provincial reconstruction team [PRT]-4), interview by the author, September 5, 2008.
16      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 7.
17      TFU G5, “Focal Paper.”
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underpinning for the Afghan government and its local and international
partners to work toward long-term stabilization goals.
Another key element of the Focal Paper was its exclusive focus on the
main population centers of Tarin Kot, Deh Rawud, and Chora. These
districts and their surrounding areas were divided into seventeen socalled focal areas. This allowed for a systematical, event-driven approach
for consolidating and expanding the TFU “ink spot,” as soon as the
security situation in a focal area would be sufficiently stable, the task
force would transfer authority to the Afghan government and security
forces and could shift its attention to the next.18 While this approach
meant a huge leap forward in terms of realistic objectives for the
expansion of TFU and local government control, its design contained a
fundamental flaw as Uruzgan’s challenging terrain dictated the borders
of the focal areas.19 Consequently, these borders sometimes cut through
interconnected communities. Nevertheless, the Focal Paper was a proper
population-centric counterinsurgency campaign plan that provided
realistic guidelines and objectives for TFU operations until the end of
the mission in 2010.
In mid-2009 the Focal Paper went through another alteration as it
became clear the mission would most probably not be extended for
another period. This ultimate plan, called the “Uruzgan Campaign
Plan,” predominantly aimed at creating the unity of effort needed for a
smooth transfer of authority to either the Afghan government and its
security forces or international coalition partners.20 The plan provided
common ground for underpinning long-term stability in Uruzgan by
providing an intellectual framework for reconstruction and development
and identifying key disablers (spoilers) and enablers of this process in
the province.
The “Uruzgan Campaign Plan,” however, was labeled “NATO
Secret,” which made it impossible to share with Afghan partners and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the province. Yet,
the plan itself provided a proper guideline for the upcoming transfer of
authority—ultimately, Australia and the United States would take over.
Furthermore, the “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” addressed the problem with
the borders of the focal areas as these were replaced by thirteen areas of
influence that allowed for optimal engagement of local communities as
their confines were determined by following socioeconomic and social
characteristics instead of terrain features.21
18      TFU G5, “Focal Paper,” 5–6.
19      Although the PRT staff had been consulted with regard to the disposition of communities
and tribal distribution, geographic features—traditionally used to divide the battle space in a military
operation—still prevailed over societal borders. Harskamp, interview; and Rietdijk, interview.
20      See, for instance, the “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” as quoted in Sebastiaan Rietjens, “Between
Expectations and Reality: The Dutch Engagement in Uruzgan,” in Statebuilding in Afghanistan:
Multinational Contributions to Reconstruction, ed. Nik Hynek and Péter Marton (London: Routledge,
2012), 74.
21     See Ingrid van Bemmel, Aletta Eikelboom, and Paul Hoefsloot, “‘Comprehensive and
Iterative Planning’ in Uruzgan, De ontwikkeling van het Uruzgan Campaign Plan’” [Comprehensive
and iterative planning in Uruzgan: The development of the Uruzgan Campaign Plan], Militaire
Spectator 179, no. 4 (2010): 205–7.
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Thus, TFU’s military strategy had evolved from the rather ad
hoc and overambitious Master Plan into the solid counterinsurgency
plan provided by the Focal Paper, and ultimately became the “Uruzgan
Campaign Plan,” which provided an underpinning for long-term efforts
after the Dutch withdrawal. All these plans originated from the various
TFU staff rotations, which illustrates the bottom-up character of the
military-strategic process during the Uruzgan mission. This lack of
strategic guidance from above also echoed in the outcome of the mission.
Especially the Focal Paper and “Uruzgan Campaign Plan” allowed for the
creation of a broad and balanced alliance of local subtribal communities
connected to the provincial government. For the time being, this
effectively enhanced security and stability as it diminished support for
the Taliban among Uruzgan’s populace. Yet, due to the lack of strategic
vision, this ad hoc political order failed to materialize as an underpinning
for long-term stability.22
The increased comprehensiveness of the TFU’s organization
encompassed a second key adaptation that enhanced the task force’s
ability to fulfill its mission effectively. While initially envisioned as a
1,200-strong task force, military planners urged for more troops as the
2006 surge of the neo-Taliban insurgency led to a deterioration of the
security situation. As a result, the Dutch military deployed more soldiers,
and total TFU strength during the entire mission varied between
1,400 and 2,000 soldiers—with peaks occurring during rotations.23
The numerical emphasis within the TFU lay on the 600-soldier battle
group, which was to provide security, assist the Afghan government and
its security forces, and enable PRT operations. This latter unit, while
numerically inferior, was key to the task force’s success as it was the
prime tool for enhancing stability by promoting good governance and
facilitating reconstruction.
The PRT was responsible for the development and diplomacy
activities within the aforementioned 3D approach. Despite the
nonmilitary character of these activities, the PRT consisted almost
exclusively of military staff led by a military commander. Initially only
two civilians operated as part of this unit, a development advisor and
a political adviser. This all changed with the deployment of TFU-5 in
July 2008 which saw a surge of civilian staff.24 A total of 12 political,
development, and cultural advisers were added to the task force, with
most of them operating within the PRT.

22      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 517–22.
23      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 378.
24      René Bouwhuis, Martijn Bronhorst, “Steentje voor steentje bouwen aan civilisering” [Stone
upon stone building toward civilianization], Defensiekrant, August 14, 2008; Peter Mollema and Kees
Matthijssen, “Uruzgan: op de goede weg, Civiel-militaire samenwerking in een complexe counterinsurgency operatie” [Uruzgan: in the right direction, civil-military cooperation in a complicated
counter-insurgency operation], Militaire Spectator 178, no. 7/8 (2009): 399–402; Jaïr van der Lijn, 3D
“The Next Generation:” Lessons Learned from Uruzgan for Future Operations (The Hague: Clingendael,
2011), 36; and Peter Mollema (civilian representative [CIVREP] TFU-5), interview by the author,
November 21, 2008.
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The influx of these new advisers was part of a reorganization aimed
at strengthening the development and diplomacy expertise of the task
force. This reorganization also introduced a system of dual command.
From July 2008 onward, the task force was jointly led by a duumvirate
consisting of the military commander and the highest-ranking diplomat,
the civilian representative (CIVREP).25 This greatly enhanced the
status of civilians—and their advice—within the TFU and therefore
allowed for a balanced approach that combined military, development,
and diplomatic activities. This status further increased in March 2009
when command over the PRT also came to rest in the hands of the
CIVREP—in practice, often exerted by the deputy CIVREP.
While the full consequences of this reorganization will be dealt
with below, it should be mentioned here that the increased involvement
of civilians enhanced the cooperation with NGOs and United Nations
organizations. When the TFU first deployed there were only 6 NGOs
in Uruzgan. By 2009, their number had increased to 30, and in 2010
some 50 NGOs were active in the province.26 These organizations
focused on a whole range of activities varying from health services
and education to rural development and veterinary assistance. Dutch
diplomats and development workers in the field therefore managed to
create circumstances in which NGOs were joining the reconstruction
effort and thereby greatly increased the comprehensiveness of the TFU.
The third key adaptation witnessed during the TFU campaign was
the gradual shift in emphasis from enemy-centric toward populationcentric intelligence. Population-centric intelligence had been included
from the planning phase of the mission, yet it was subordinated to
classical military intelligence focusing on the opposing militants and
the challenging terrain. Moreover, dissemination proved troublesome
as the TFU’s military intelligence section remained focused on the
Taliban despite TFU commanders stressing the need for a populationcentric approach or making statements such as “it’s all about the Afghan
people.”27 Even after a specialized tribal adviser was appointed at the
end of 2006, this situation remained unchanged. This adviser either met
stiff resistance when pointing at the importance of understanding local
society or decided that sharing information with the military was of no
use and could possibly endanger key informants.
The PRT, however, which held a traditional nonmilitary role, proved
fertile soil for the knowledge provided by the tribal adviser. This led to the
emergence of a renewed understanding of the conflict ecosystem, which
conceptualized the situation in Uruzgan as multifaceted and consisting
of multiple layers. Instead of the much-used Taliban-Government
dichotomy, the conflict was gradually understood as evolving around
political and economic power struggles involving local strongmen,
25       See also Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 176; and Kitzen, “Course of Cooption,” 443.
26      Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 173–74.
27      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 404.
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former mujahideen factions, various subtribes, and a mesh of solidarity
networks interconnecting all these different strands.28
This insight became firmly embedded when during TFU-2 the
Taliban launched an all-out attack on the Chora district. Dutch forces
managed to fend off the insurgents by first blocking further incursions
with the crucial assistance of hastily mobilized local militias and the
subsequent staging of a counterattack that drove the enemy from the
district. Local allies, thus, were instrumental to the successful outcome of
this battle. The effective rallying of their militias by the PRT was a direct
result of the thriving cooperation between the tribal adviser and PRT
staff, and clearly illustrated the benefits of a thorough understanding of
the local social landscape.
The battle of Chora, therefore, created “awareness and an operational
sense of urgency to adapt” and, therefore, might be considered the key
“adaptive moment” of the TFU campaign.29 Henceforth, the TFU would
integrate tribal and political analyses in its military planning process,
which enhanced the task force’s understanding of the local operational
environment. The aforementioned influx of additional civilian
expertise greatly accelerated this process of integration. In 2009, TFU-6
commander Brigadier General Tom Middendorp clearly illustrated the
insights that followed from this approach when he stated “the Taliban
[in Uruzgan] are less of a threat to the tottering structures of the Afghan
state than feuding local tribes and predatory warlords. . . . This seems to
have created lasting turmoil which is exploited by the Taliban.”30 TFU-7
CIVREP Michel Rentenaar even went a step further when he declared
after the end of his tour in 2010 that not only the emphasis in intelligence
had shifted from enemy-centric to population-centric, but that this also
had evoked a similar shift in emphasis in operations.31
This brings us to our fourth and final key adaptation, the shift
in operations from almost exclusively kinetic to a more balanced
approach emphasising nonkinetic methods.32 Despite the fabled claims
of a nonviolent Dutch approach, the use of force had dominated TFU
operations from the beginning of the mission. Of course, the local security
situation rendered frequent kinetic confrontations with the Taliban
unavoidable. Yet, the absolute emphasis on kinetic operations was mainly
the result of the traditional military skills that had been imprinted on
the soldiers’ minds. Predeployment training initially neither reflected the
complicated nature of the mission, nor the intricacies of the operational
28     Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 397–99. See also Colonel Nico Tak, “PRT Briefing,”
(briefing, Amersfoort, Utrecht, Netherlands, September 4, 2009); TFU Development Cooperation
Tribal Advisor, interview with the author, March 1, 2010; Colonel Gerard Koot (commander PRT2), interview by the author, December 19, 2009; and Vleugels, interview by the author, December
7, 2009.
29      Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,” 175. See also Frans Osinga and James A. Russell,
“Conclusion: Military Adaptation and the War in Afghanistan,” in Military Adaptation, 293–94; and
Kitzen, “Close Encounters,” 722.
30      “Dutch Model”
31      Hans Ariëns, “Interview: Michel Rentenaar,”One World, April 4, 2010.
32      On the adaptations in the field of operations, see Kitzen, Rietjens, and Osinga, “Soft Power,”
176–81.
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environment in which it was conducted. This gradually changed when
the insights from subsequent TFU rotations were incorporated in the
work-up program and more attention was given to cultural awareness
and nonkinetic tasks, such as key leader engagements. Moreover, the
final exercise that brought together the various subunits of a TFU
rotation (called Uruzgan Integration) became increasingly realistic, as it
was supervised by officers who had actually served in Uruzgan.
During the whole four-year period of the TFU mission, patrols
remained the main modus operandi for delivering effects. Typically, an
infantry platoon augmented with a PRT mission team and other elements
(including enablers, such as forward air controllers and explosive
ordnance disposal engineers) would be tasked for multiday missions, in
which they would spend the night at patrol bases or temporary overnight
locations. Frequently encountering firefights, as well as the increasing
threat of improvised explosive devices, these patrols were forced to
take a robust stance. Force protection was bolstered by acquiring mineresistant Bushmaster vehicles and relying on air support.
While such patrols took place among the local populace, their
primary mission typically concerned disrupting Taliban activities,
with PRT affairs, gathering of information from the people, and
psychological operations as secondary tasks.33 This gradually changed
as more population-centric intelligence became available, and the
awareness arose that this conflict was all about Uruzgan’s highly
fragmented social landscape. From 2007 (after the battle of Chora),
patrols were increasingly dispatched to enable PRT activities aimed at
obtaining influence over various communities and connecting these
people to the provincial government. Population-centric patrols came to
dominate TFU operations, a development which was partly accelerated
by the influx of additional civilian advisers who provided much-needed
expertise for delivering development aid and assisting local authorities.
Thus, patrols became the main platform for nonkinetic engagement
which greatly enhanced the TFU’s influence over the local population.
With regard to large-scale operations, a similar shift can be
observed. Whereas the TFU initially had lacked the means for holding
the areas it had cleared from Taliban presence, this changed at the end
of 2008 when Afghan security forces became available in sufficient
numbers. From then on, operations could be planned with the aim of
establishing control over local communities in the target area. This was
first pioneered during Operation Bor Barakai in October 2008, when
at the end of the operation, a patrol base was constructed in order to
consolidate the results. Yet, this proved unsuccessful as the base was
located at a hilltop on the outer boundary of the target valley. Operation
Tura Ghar in January 2009 proved more successful in applying the new
approach as it not only established a patrol base in the middle of the
33      See for instance, Lieutenant Colonel Andy van Dijk, “Personal Diary” (unpublished personal
record, 2007, private collection); and Captain Gijs-Jan Schüssler, “Experiences Platoon Commander
TF-7 in Uruzgan” (presentation, 13 Mechanized Brigade Counterinsurgency Seminar, Breda,
Netherlands, September 3, 2008).
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troublesome Baluchi Valley, but also included shaping operations, such as
establishing “below the radar” contacts with key tribal leaders (of whom
some resided in Quetta, Pakistan). Thus, large-scale operations followed
the pattern of patrols and increasingly became focused on delivering
nonkinetic effects and thereby also contributed to the increase of TFU
influence in the province.
In summary, it can be concluded that four key adaptations that
occurred in the fields of strategy, organization, intelligence, and
operations contributed to an evolutionary process that turned the TFU
from a predominantly enemy-centric, kinetic military force into a capable
counterinsurgency and stabilization force that emphasized nonkinetic
methods for influencing the local population and connecting these
people to the Afghan authorities. The key lesson to be learned from the
Afghanistan War, therefore, concerns the ability to adopt a populationcentric approach—when necessary—from the onset of a campaign.
It should also be mentioned that this approach should be enhanced
through logical and lucid strategic guidelines provided by policymakers
at the political level. In case of the TFU, however, such clear guidance
was lacking. Key adaptations during the Dutch mission were mainly
a consequence of bottom-up initiatives by either the TFU staff or its
subunits. Moreover, while Dutch soldiers showed a remarkable ability to
adapt, the absence of clear strategic guidance and vision from The Hague
would haunt the TFU after the eighth and final rotation redeployed.
Due to the lack of high-level coordination with American and
Australian successors, the results of the Dutch mission were squandered
within four months as the new Combined Team Uruzgan opted
for another approach to local affairs which led to the crumbling of
the so carefully crafted tribal balance.34 Future missions, therefore,
should be deployed with clear political guidelines based on a thorough
understanding of the local situation and the conflict as well as the
international operational environment in which troops are deployed.
Only then might a contribution by the relatively small Dutch military
provide an underpinning for long-term stability. Doing so, however,
first requires the military to learn the lessons from Uruzgan and be
prepared to adopt a population-centric approach whenever necessary.
Therefore, it is important to discuss the extent to which the lessons from
the Uruzgan campaign have been institutionalized within the Dutch
armed forces.

Lessons Learned?

Paradoxically the numerical weakness of the Dutch military is both
a strength and a weakness. Thanks to its small size, it possesses the
ability to learn quickly from operational experiences through informal
information sharing, especially within the tight community of the officer
corps. During the TFU mission, this networked learning allowed for
the rapid dissemination of new insights from the field. Best practices
34      Kitzen, “Course of Co-option,” 507.
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as well as information on the local situation freely flowed through the
organization. When the mission proceeded, this process was further
stimulated by facilitating the transfer of knowledge between rotations
during predeployment training. Yet, this informal character of learning
during actual operations comes at the expense of institutional learning,
which is notoriously weak within the Dutch armed forces.
As early as February 2008, an attempt was made to capture the
insights from the field when a draft pamphlet entitled Observations on
Operations in Afghanistan emerged.35 This report was prepared by army
officers who had served in the first two TFU rotations and in the staff of
Regional Command South. These key officers had meticulously recorded
their observations on new experiences at the operational, tactical, and
technical level. Most importantly, the bulletin emphasized the need to
adapt the mindset from enemy-centric kinetic operations to nonkinetic
population-centric counterinsurgency warfare. However, for no obvious
reasons, this carefully prepared bulletin was never officially disseminated
within the armed forces.36 The traditional informal learning process, yet,
guaranteed the draft paper was distributed among future TFU rotations
and informed predeployment training. The insights of the pamphlet
were also to be incorporated into a new army doctrine. Nevertheless,
when this doctrine was published in 2009, it was hard to find any trace
of the lessons from the field as even the term counterinsurgency was
hardly mentioned.37
In 2010, with the end of the TFU mission in sight, a new impulse
was given to the institutionalization of lessons from Afghanistan. An
official report was published on the performance of Dutch officers and
noncomissioned officers in an operational environment characterized
by joint, combined, and interagency operations. Recommendations
included a better integration of civilian expertise and additional training
in counterinsurgency to foster a population-centric mindset.38 These
recommendations were echoed in the official governmental evaluation
of the TFU mission that appeared in 2011.39 The armed forces themselves
had started to collect lessons identified and best practices in order to kickstart the institutional learning process. The army gathered the combined
35      Pieter Soldaat and Dirk Jan Broks, “Concept Informatiebulletin 08/01, Observaties over
Operaties in Afghanistan” [Concept information bulletin 08/01: observations on operations in
Afghanistan], (draft doctrinal pamphlet, Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, Amersfoort,
Utrecht, Netherlands, 2008).
36      Eventually the authors took the initiative to publish the bulletin as two articles in the
professional military magazine Militaire Spectator in mid-2009. See Pieter Soldaat et al., “Observaties
rond operaties in Afghanistan (I)” [Observations concerning operations in Afghanistan I], Militaire
Spectator 178, no. 5 (2009); and Pieter Soldaat et al., “Observaties rond operaties in Afghanistan (II)”
[Observations concerning operations in Afghanistan II], Militaire Spectator 178, no. 6 (2009).
37      Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, Land Doctrine Publicatie, Militaire Doctrine voor
het Landoptreden [Land doctrine publication, military doctrine for land operations] (Amersfoort,
Netherlands: Opleidings- en Trainingscentrum Operatiën, 2009).
38      Commandant der Strijdkrachten, Van Eredivisie naar Europees Voetbal [From premier league to
European competition] (The Hague: Defensiestaf, 2010).
39      Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Ministerie van Defensie, Eindevaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage
aan ISAF, 2006–2010 [Final evaluation Dutch contribution to ISAF, 2006–2010] (The Hague:
Rijksoverheid, 2011), 111.
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insights from all TFU commanders and invited soldiers to submit their
experiences as well. For this purpose, 21 committees were established
to process these contributions and feed them into the learning process.
Furthermore, the defense staff published an extensive report on
lessons identified that were to be preserved for future operations.40
Ultimately, insights from Afghanistan echoed in the 2014 army doctrine,
which elaborates on stabilization operations, the comprehensive
approach, and nonkinetic tasks. The importance of a populationcentric mindset is even stressed in the preface which concludes with
the statement “operations with and amongst people: the strength of the
Royal Netherlands Army.”41 Moreover, by this time the Dutch military
had formally adopted NATO’s new Allied Joint Publication-3.4.4
Counterinsurgency as its official doctrine for counterinsurgency operations.42
Thus, it seems the Dutch armed forces had finally succeeded in
capturing and codifying lessons from Afghanistan. Yet, lessons have
only been learned when they are also incorporated by the very troops
that should bring them into practice during new operations. A 2015 study
revealed this was not the case; knowledge on counterinsurgency and
stabilization had virtually evaporated (even in the case of experienced
officers) or was completely absent, and nonkinetic tasks were rarely
practiced.43 Training and exercises were almost exclusively enemy-centric
and focused on conventional, kinetic military tasks. The traditional,
informal character of learning in the Dutch military had prevented the
ideas and concepts of the new doctrines to feed back into the units that
had initially observed these lessons in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the
renewed dominance of enemy-centric thinking and large-scale, kinetic
operations was stimulated by the military’s top brass. This, of course,
was augmented by the reemergence of the Russian threat. As of yet, the
Dutch military again is fully focused on conventional battle.
In the end, therefore, the conclusion has to be drawn that while
a lot has been learned in the field in Afghanistan and an attempt has
been made to institutionalize these lessons, they cannot be considered
learned. At the moment, the Dutch armed forces are caught in a familiar
pattern: the pendulum has fully swung back to enemy-centric thinking
and large-scale kinetic operations, which renders population-centric
concepts and nonkinetic tasks to perceived inferior importance. While
this has occurred more often in Western military history, our times
40      Ministerie van Defensie, “Lessons Identified ISAF” (unpublished internal report, defense
staff, 2011).
41      Koninklijke Landmacht, Doctrinepublicatie 3.2 Landoperaties [Doctrine publication 3.2 land
operations] (Amersfoort, Netherlands: Land Warfare Centre, 2014), v.
42      Accepting NATO doctrine as national doctrine has not been without critique. While the
Dutch were leading the writing of Allied Joint Publication-3.4.4, this doctrine was clearly the result
of a precarious process of international consensus, and therefore, it is not as strong as the American
FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency or the Ministry of Defense, Security and Stabilisation: The Military Contribution,
Joint Doctrine Publication 3-40 (Shrivenham: Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Center, 2009).
Although an improved version was published in 2016, the doctrine is still inferior to other state-ofthe-art manuals.
43      Sjoerd de Winter, “The Army after Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Netherlands Defense
Academy, 2015), 47–51.
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require the urgent breaching of this dichotomous pattern of enemycentric and population-centric warfare.44
Modern warfare typically requires the ability to deal with hybrid
threats (state and nonstate alike) through kinetic as well as nonkinetic
actions. Current instability in Africa and the Middle East might lead
to new interventions in order to foster stability. The Dutch military
is exemplary in this regard as it is predominantly training for highend conventional warfare, but all actual deployments concern either
stabilization or counterinsurgency-like missions. Dutch soldiers are
still active in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. The time has come to learn the
lessons from the Afghan Campaign and imprint the population-centric
mindset in the military toolbox so it can be utilized whenever necessary.

44      See also Martijn Kitzen, “Conventional and Unconventional War Are Not Opposites,” War
Room, March 28, 2019.

